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[Both “intellectual property” and “the corporation” can be and have 
been characterized as convenient legal fictions. Both also continue to 
be increasingly instrumental realities in the commercial world. This 
paper examines what happens when these two fictions collide - the 
issue of directors’ and other officers’ liability for intellectual property 
infringements by companies. Courts and commentators alike have 
generally advocated the primacy of the separate entity principle of 
corporate law in order to safeguard commercial enterprise and 
adventure. However, if intellectual property is viewed in accordance 
with its underlying justification, as a form of incentive necessary to 
promote new and useful innovations and creations, then any 
avoidance of responsibility by directors potentially undermines that 
incentive. In this event, the question must be posed as to whether the 
role and place of intellectual property in society warrants (or, indeed, 
receives) special treatment in cases involving companies infringing 
intellectual property rights.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Two recent Federal Court decisions in cases relating to peer to peer file 
sharing1 and internet service providers2 have again raised the issue of 
director/officer liability for infringement of intellectual property rights by  
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1 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1.  
2  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409. 
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companies. Infringement of a person’s intellectual property rights has long 
been considered tortious.3  If a company is alleged to have committed such a 
tort, then the question immediately arises as to the position of directors or 
other officers of the company4 acting for and on behalf of the company and 
whether it is possible for a plaintiff to take action against both the company 
and those individuals for the damage caused. A plaintiff may wish to do this 
for economic reasons, such as the perilous financial position of the corporate 
defendant, and in some cases, as a deterrent to other potential infringers.5 
 
In a somewhat abstract sense this might be viewed as an encounter between 
two different convenient legal fictions: the corporation, and intellectual 
property rights. The importance of characterizing these concepts as fictions 
lies in the justifications given for their existence, principles, and efficacy. The 
more practical question to be explored is whether it can be said that the 
interests of one fiction does (or should) take precedence over the other at 
times when those interests compete.  
 
This paper will briefly contemplate these familiar concepts as legal fictions. It 
will then examine the separate entity principle which has been central to 
corporate law theory, the clash of principle and policy behind the reasons for 
the courts’ traditional reluctance to impose liability on directors generally for 
torts committed by companies, and the disparate approaches taken by courts 
to the issue. The paper also provides an analysis of recent intellectual property 
case law, in an attempt to establish whether a more unified approach to the 
issue of director liability for intellectual property infringements by companies 
is beginning to emerge.  
 
Moreover, it is hoped that this paper may provide a starting point from which 
to analyse how the reasoning behind these cases fits into a broader theoretical 
framework about corporate law principle, policy and theory, and the  
 
                                                 
3 WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corp Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 456, 465 (Gummow J); 
Microsoft Corporation and Another v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 111, 
121; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 
213, 258.  
4 From this point I refer only to directors of companies, both for convenience and 
because cases involving directors have been more prevalent. However, the 
considerations referred to throughout this paper apply equally to other company 
officers and employees. See Part 5.C below regarding the law on this issue.  
5 In the words of Wilcox J, ‘ the occasional legal proceeding may be useful pour 
encourager des autres’-see Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License 
Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1, 87 [351].  
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justifications for intellectual property. In other words, whether the role and 
place of intellectual property in society warrants (or receives) special 
treatment in cases involving companies infringing intellectual property rights. 
If it does, this poses some interesting challenges to those commentators 
asserting the primacy of the separate entity doctrine that may, in effect, allow 
companies to undermine the incentives provided by the intellectual property 
regime to innovate and create.  
 
II  LEGAL FICTIONS AND OTHER ‘TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE’ 
 
Legal concepts (for example, corporations or property rights) are supernatural 
entities which do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.6 
 
A fiction is something which, although false, is accepted as true for the sake 
of convenience.7 Jurisprudence, as an autonomous system of legal concepts, 
rules and arguments, many of which rely on such fictions, was for legal 
realist, Felix Cohen, akin to ‘a special branch of the science of transcendental 
nonsense’.8 This phenomenon might be better described as ‘the metaphysical 
burden of social reality’.9 Searle points to social facts (in no way limited to 
the legal system) and explains: 
 
[T]here are portions of the real world, objective facts, in the world, that are 
only facts by human agreement. In a sense there are things that exist only 
because we believe them to exist…these things are “objective” facts in the 
sense that they are not a matter of your or my preferences, evaluations, or 
moral attitudes.10  
 
In a purely practical sense, the relationship of both ‘intellectual property’ and 
‘the corporation’ to physical reality is problematic. For example, with regard 
to intellectual property, Litman comments that ‘[i]n the face of intellectual 
property’s lack of “thingness”, the law must supply alternative concepts to 
take the place of physical boundaries’.11 The strongest and most popular 
justification for intellectual property protection is a utilitarian argument based  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Felix S Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 
(6) Columbia Law Review 809, 821. 
7 Compact Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed). 
8 Cohen, above n 6, 821. 
9 John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995)1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Jessica Litman, ‘The Public Domain’ (1990) 39 Emory Law Journal 965, 971-972. 
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on providing incentives to create.12 The Lockean labour theory of property13 is 
familiar to intellectual property scholars – the justification for intellectual 
property rights being that ‘society rewards labor with property purely on the 
instrumental grounds that we must provide rewards to get labor’.14 This 
concept of a ‘reward’ theory means that the property rights of authors and 
inventors are a convenient fiction that is justified only by the social utility of 
the whole intellectual property system.15 
 
Similarly, the corporation has often been characterized as a legal fiction.16 
Brennan J, in Northside Developments Pty Ltd v Registrar-General,17 
comments that ‘[a] company, being a corporation, is a legal fiction. Its 
existence, capacities and activities are only such as the law attributes to it’.18  
Cohen, on the other hand, laments the fact that:  
 
Nobody has ever seen a corporation…To be sure, some of us have seen 
corporate funds, corporate transactions, etc. … But this does not give us the 
right to hypostatize, to “thingify” the corporation.19 
 
Realist acerbity notwithstanding, the fictionalists firmly believe a corporation 
is nothing more than ‘a creature of the state’ and this view is consistent with 
and supported by the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)20 dealing 
with the creation of a new corporation in the form of a registered company.21  
 
 
                                                 
12 Edwin C Hettinger, ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’ (1989) 18 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 31, 47. 
13 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government 
(1698), Chapter V.  
14 See generally Justin Hughes, ‘The Philosophy of Intellectual Property’ (1988) 77 
Georgetown Law Journal 287, 296. 
15 Henry C Mitchell, The Intellectual Commons – Toward an Ecology of Intellectual 
Property (2005) 5. 
16 R Austin and I Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (12th ed, 2005) 
[2.080]. 
17 (1990) 170 CLR 146. 
18 (1990) 170 CLR 146, 171. 
19 Cohen, above n 6, 811. 
20 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 119. 
21 Austin and Ramsay, above n 16, [2.080]. Cf those theorists (principally the realists) 
who argue that incorporation is merely the formal recognition of a pre-existing social 
collective. For other theories of the corporation see generally George Gillligan, 
‘Company Law and the Regulation of Financial Services in the Twenty-First Century: 
A Socio-Legal Perspective’ (2001) 3 International and Comparative Corporate Law 
Journal 33, 36-37. 
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We need not labour the point, as these legal fictions are familiar to us, and 
somewhat paradoxically, they are both increasingly essential commercial 
realities. But the question to be answered is how they interact when they are 
brought together in an adversarial sense.  
 
III COMPANY LAW DOCTRINE AND THE SEPARATE ENTITY PRINCIPLE 
 
Essential to any discussion of the tension between company law and 
intellectual property(or tort law where a breach of intellectual property rights 
has occurred) is a brief explanation of the nature of the corporation and 
consequences of incorporation. 
 
It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that a company is a juristic 
person separate and distinct from those who make up and/or control the 
company.22 The well known principles laid down in Salomon v Salomon23  
mean that an act performed or committed in the name of the company is 
regarded as its own act. It is said that those behind the company are protected 
by the ‘corporate veil’, a convenient metaphor which emphasizes the separate 
legal personality of the corporation. As a general rule, the courts have given 
primacy24 to the separate entity principle so that it is not possible to look 
behind the corporate veil to hold personally liable the person who is the 
directing mind and will, or ‘the moving spirit’,25 of the company. The purpose 
of the separate entity principle is to encourage commercial enterprise and 
adventure and limit any unreasonable risks associated with company office; a 
fact alluded to by courts when faced with primacy issues in all areas.26 
 
 
                                                 
22  The process of making an abstract idea real or concrete is known as reification. See 
Helen Anderson, ‘The Theory of the Corporation and its Relevance to Directors’ 
Tortious Liability to Creditors’ (2004) 16 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
LEXIS 1-72, 15. 
23 [1897] AC 22. 
24 Some commentators have suggested that such company law doctrines must be 
given primacy as such primacy is inherent in the very nature of company law - see R 
Grantham and C Rickett, ‘Directors’ Tortious Liability: Contract, Tort or Company 
Law?’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 133, 139. 
25 As described in Martin Engineering Co and Another v Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd and 
Others (1991) IPR 241, 242; MCA Records Inc and Another v Charly Records Ltd 
and Others [2001] EWCA Civ 1441.  
26 For example Slade LJ in C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand [1985] 2 All ER 415; 
Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc 
[1978] 89 DLR (3d) 195. See also G H L Fridman, ‘Personal Tort Liability of 
Company Directors’ (1992) 5 Canterbury Law Review 41, 44. 
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While courts have recognised that the corporate veil may be lifted in certain 
circumstances, the applicable legal principles are often difficult to disentwine 
from the surrounding metaphor. Adding to the conceptual complexity is the 
fact that the doctrine enshrined in Salomon is also connected to the nature of a 
director’s liability under organic theory,27 explained by Lord Denning as 
follows: 
 
Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are 
nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the 
mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing 
mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of 
these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law 
as such. 28 
 
This means that even though the company is a separate juristic person, it is 
unable to act other than through living persons and the director must act as the 
company. As a result, the director is in a unique position of being the 
embodiment or persona of the company with his mind being the mind of the 
company.29 Recent Australian intellectual property cases have recognised or 
applied30 the organic theory. For example, as Finkelstein J states:  
 
A corporation is an abstraction; a creature of statute. It can carry out acts 
only because the law attributes to the corporation certain actions of its 
directors and officers. Thus a corporation can interfere with the rights of a 
third party only when the acts constituting the unlawful interference are 
attributed to the corporation.31 
 
It is this theoretical framework which causes the difficulties encountered by 
courts and commentators in determining whether and to what extent a director  
 
                                                 
27 From Lennard ’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705, 713-
4 in which Viscount Haldane LC referred to directors not as agents but as the 
company itself, a process known as “anthropomorphism”; see Anderson above n 22, 
52.;For a general discussion see D Wishart ‘Anthropomorphism Rampant: Rounding 
up Executive Directors’ Liability’ [1993] New Zealand Law Journal 175. 
28 HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159, 172 
29 See for example the comments of Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 
[1972] AC 153. 
30 Recent examples of the application of this principle are found in the decisions of 
Tamberlin J in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409 and 
Wilcox J in  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd 
(2005) 220 ALR 1, 101 [421]. 
31 Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others 
(2000) 177 ALR 231, 260 (Finkelstein J). 
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should be personally liable for the acts and omissions of a company.32 One 
commentator has commented that in this area the law is ‘trying to have it both 
ways, or to have its cake and eat it’): in some cases a director is treated as 
completely distinct from the company (as was the case in Salomon) and in 
others he is considered to be the personification of the company.33 However 
the purpose of organic theory is to attribute a mental state to a company, an 
inanimate entity with no mind or will, not to ‘exculpate directors from 
liability’.34. It is not a reason to deny personal liability of a director of a 
company to a creditor of that company.35 
 
IV THE PRIMACY QUESTION - COMPANY LAW THEORY AND THIRD 
PARTY DAMAGE 
 
While on occasion there may be sound policy reasons why liability should be 
imposed on directors personally for torts committed in the course of 
operating the company, prima facie, company law doctrines must necessarily 
be accorded primacy. While such a claim may seem imperialistic, such 
primacy is inherent in the very nature of company law.36  
 
The question of personal liability of company directors for torts committed by 
corporations is a classic example of a clash of legal principle and has provided 
difficult questions of policy to be resolved by courts. At issue are the 
fundamental principles underpinning both tort law and corporate law: alterum 
non laedere, the principle that everyone is answerable for their tortious 
wrongs; and the separate legal entity doctrine in accordance with the 
principles laid down in Salomon v Salomon.37 Courts have found it relatively 
easy to recognise the problems of principle and policy inherent in this area.38 
The solution has proved more elusive. Hardie Boys J put the issue quite 
simply: 
 
The problem that has vexed the common law courts in this area is that of 
respecting the doctrine of separate legal personality on the one hand and of 
allowing an adequate remedy on the other.39 
 
                                                 
32 Anderson above n 22, 45. 
33 Fridman, above n 26,54. 
34 Ibid 59. 
35 Anderson above n 22, 54. 
36 Grantham and Rickett, above n 24,139. 
37 [1897] AC 22. 
38  For example Mentmore Manufacturing Co Ltd v National Merchandising 
Manufacturing Co Inc (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195, 202 (Le Dain J). 
39 Trevor Ivory v Anderson [1992] 2 NZLR 517,525 (Hardie Boys J). 
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Unfortunately, the courts have not been unified in their approach to the 
resolution of an obviously difficult conceptual issue. As Anderson has 
recently noted, there are many instances where courts have been reluctant to 
hold a director liable for the tortious acts of his company for fear of 
undermining the separate legal entity doctrine and the organic theory of 
corporate law.40 This is often because courts find that despite valid economic 
and social policy reasons for imposing responsibility on a director, a creditor’s 
contract is with the company itself.41 Such arguments should not, of course, be 
relevant to the determination of intellectual property cases as third parties are 
invariably involuntary tort creditors with whom the company has no 
contract.42 In other cases, courts have demonstrated an unrestrained 
willingness to completely overlook the separate entity principle to hold 
directors personally liable. One of the reasons for this disparity has been a 
lack of theoretical understanding by courts of the meaning of separate legal 
identity and limited liability as it relates to corporations, and the intersection 
of these principles with the law of torts.43  
 
V AVENUES TO LIABILITY IN IP CASES 
 
So where does the general rule relating to the primacy of the corporate veil 
leave tort creditors wishing to take action against directors of a company 
which has infringed their intellectual property rights? What are the avenues 
which lead to directors’ personal liability? 
 
There is no doubt that a person who commits a tort himself will be primarily 
liable, whether a director of a company, employee or otherwise. As noted by 
the court in C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand:44 
 
[A] director of a company will [not] escape personal liability to third parties 
for torts which he has personally committed through his own hand (or 
mouth) merely because he committed the tort in the course of carrying out 
his duties as a director of his company. He can escape personal liability for 
such torts no more than can an employee acting in the course of his 
employment for a company, or an agent acting in the course of his agency 
for a company. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Anderson, above n 22, 16. 
41 Ibid 16-17. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid 71 and generally for a comprehensive discussion of the theory of the 
corporation and its relevance to the area of tort liability of directors. 
44 [1985] 2 All ER 415, 419. 
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In such a case, the infringing activity (whether under statute or at common 
law) must be examined, together with the facts which constituted 
infringement by the company, to determine if the director, in fact, participated 
in the activities to the required degree, or conducted those activities in person.  
 
Similarly, a director will be found personally liable if the company was 
established for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act or if the use of the 
company was an abuse which justified lifting the corporate veil.45 But in 
circumstances where it is the company which actually commits the tort, the 
question arises as to what degree of involvement on the part of a director is 
necessary for him to be rendered personally liable along with the company. It 
is firmly established that the holding of an office in a company, such as that of 
director or managing director does not, of itself, render that office holder 
liable.46 However, courts have continuously grappled with exactly what 
principles are applicable in such cases: joint tortfeasance; authorisation 
pursuant to relevant intellectual property legislation;47 or other general law 
principles which have the effect of piercing the corporate veil. 
 
In Australian intellectual property cases, guidance in this regard has come 
from the judgment of Gummow J in WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corp 
Ltd:48 
 
Where the infringer is a corporation, questions frequently arise as to the 
degree of involvement on the part of the directors necessary for them to be 
rendered personally liable. Those questions are not immediately answered by 
principles dealing with “authorization” or joint tortfeasance. Rather, recourse 
is to be had to the body of authority which explains the circumstances in 
which an officer of a corporation is personally liable for the torts of the 
corporation. 49  
 
                                                 
45 Rainham Chemical Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465. See 
generally J H Farrar, ‘The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts’ (1997) 
9 Bond Law Review 102, 105; Anderson above n 22, 19. 
46 Microsoft Corporation v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 111 at 121; C 
Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand [1985] 2 All ER 415, 329; King v Milpurrurru (1996) 
66 FCR 474; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 5 
IPR 213, 258. 
47 Such as Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36 and 101; Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 13(1) but 
note that different considerations apply to the different legislation. 
48 (1987) 77 ALR 456.  
49 WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corp Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 456, 475 (Gummow J 
referring to C Evan & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand [1985] 2 All ER 415 and Kalamazoo 
(Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 213).  
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It is the ‘body of authority’ referred to by Gummow J which has been the 
subject of most judicial discussion and disagreement. However, the principles 
of joint tortfeasance and authorisation are also raised in cases seeking to 
examine directors’ liability for corporate torts. All three areas are discussed 
below. 
 
 A Joint Tortfeasance 
 
The statement of Gummow J quoted above has been referred to in numerous 
cases, especially with regard to the application of the principles of joint 
tortfeasance to the issue of director liability.50 For example, Beazley J in King 
v Milpurrurru,51 agreed that the principles of joint tortfeasance were not 
applicable because the essence of joint tortfeasance is ‘concerted action to a 
common end’.52 In other words, it is not enough that two or more persons 
assisted in or concurred in or contributed to an act causing damage, there must 
be a common design or something in the nature of agreed common action.53 
This notion does not fit easily with the liability of a director for the company's 
wrongs because the person who is the directing mind and will of the company 
is an embodiment of the company and his mind is the mind of the company.54  
 
For these reasons the current approach of the English appellate courts55 which 
have developed a joint tortfeasors framework in the context of directors’ 
liability56 has not found favour in Australia.  
                                                 
50 For example in Microsoft Corporation v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 
111, 121 (Lindgren J); King v Milpurrurru, (1996) 136 ALR 327; Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1; Universal 
Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409. 
51 (1996) 136 ALR 327, 344-5. 
52 The "Koursk" [1924] P 140, 159-60 cited with approval in Australia in 
International Inc v Hanimex Corp Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 456; Thompson v Australian 
Capital Television Pty Ltd (1996) 141 ALR 1, King v Milpurrurru, (1996) 136 ALR 
327; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409.  
53 WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corp Ltd (1987) 77 ALR 456; Universal  Music 
Australia v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409, 438  [135]. 
54 King v Milpurrurru (1996) 136 ALR 327, 344-5 (Beazley J referring to comments 
by Lord Reid in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, 170-1). 
55  A recent example is the decision in MCA Records Inc and Another v Charly 
Records Ltd and others [2001] EWCA Civ 1441 applying intellectual property cases 
such as CBS Songs v Amstrad [1988] 2 All ER 484 and Unilever plc v Gillette (UK) 
Ltd [1989] RPC 583. 
56  See generally D Debenham, ‘Return to the Beaten Path?: Directors’ and 
Employees’ Liability for Intellectual Property Torts after Mentmore’ (2003)16. 
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Recently, in the case of Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper 
(‘Cooper’),57 Tamberlin J, after considering the authorities on joint 
tortfeasors,  concluded that there was not sufficient common design 
established as between the parties in question to make them liable in respect 
of their participation in the infringement. At issue was whether, inter alia, a 
director and an employee of an incorporated internet service provider had 
shown a sufficient degree of common design or concerted action to make 
them joint tortfeasors either with internet users, or the owner/operator of the 
MP3S4FREE website who was found to have infringed various sections of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).58 
 
In Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd 
(‘Sharman’),59 while not deciding the issue of director liability on the basis of 
joint tortfeasance, Wilcox J found that all respondents liable for authorisation 
of the infringement of the applicants’ copyright were liable both individually 
and as joint tortfeasors pursuant to a common design.60 
 
Generally, in Australia, courts have determined the liability of directors or 
officers of a company by reference either to authorisation, or by applying the 
various general law tests of director liability for torts of a company. 
 
 B Authorisation 
 
Where it is alleged that a company, together with a director or other officer of 
the company, authorised the infringing acts pursuant to the relevant 
intellectual property legislation, those individuals will be primarily liable.61 In 
that event it is necessary to determine the precise meaning of ‘authorise’. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to canvas in any depth the increasingly 
substantial issues relating to authorisation.62  
                                                                                                                    
Intellectual Property Journal 527, 530 who refers to this approach as ‘a beacon of 
appellate guidance’ in a very difficult area of law. 
57 (2005) 65 IPR 409, 438 [134]-[137]. 
58 In Cooper, the court did find that the director and employee were liable under the 
authorisation provisions of the legislation. 
59 (2005) 220 ALR 1. 
60 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd  (2005) 220 
ALR 1, 112 [489]. 
61 Note however the view of Gummow J in WEA v Hanimex (1987) 77 ALR 456 that 
the concept of “authorisation” in the Copyright legislation had its own independent 
operation from primary infringement and that approach was endorsed by a Full Court 
in Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v Jain (1990) 26 FCR 53, 57. 
62  The law of authorisation in Australia is referred to by the principles set out in 
Moorhouse v University of New South Wales [1976] RPC 151. 
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In such cases, courts are called on to consider whether the acts of a director or 
officer procuring his company to infringe a copyright or patent could amount 
to an ‘authorisation’ or whether the ‘authorisation’ would only be by the 
company itself.63 If the authorisation is found only to have been made by the 
company as the director’s action falls short of the necessary requirements, 
then courts must still return to general principles set out above to examine if 
the director is liable for procuring or directing the company to authorise the 
infringement. 
 
In Sharman’s case, liability was imposed in circumstances where individual 
directors or officers were shown to have been personally involved, in a 
deliberate and continuing way, in the company’s authorisation of infringing 
conduct.64 
 
It is interesting to note the differences in approach between the Sharman and 
Cooper cases on this issue. In Cooper, the court examined the principles of 
joint tortfeasance and authorisation under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
concluding that joint tortfeasance was not established on the evidence, but 
authorisation was quite clearly shown on the part of the director and employee 
of the corporate internet service provider, E-Talk/Com-Cen. The director and 
employee were found personally liable for authorisation as a result of their 
knowledge of, and failure to prevent, the breach. It was through this 
knowledge of the director that the company was made liable for authorisation 
as the director was the controlling mind of the company.65 This is an example 
of the correct application of the organic theory of corporate law. 
 
 C General law principles 
 
Three tests66 have evolved from cases where courts have sought to determine 
the personal liability of directors for the tortious conduct of the companies for  
 
                                                 
63 Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others 
(2000) 177 ALR 231, 268. 
64  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1, 105 [444]. 
65  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409, 437 [130]. 
66 It is thought that the principles extracted from the cases preferring the “assumption 
of liability” test, although considered and reviewed by courts dealing with intellectual 
property infringements, are quite limited in their application to the area of the tort of 
negligence and therefore will not be discussed here. See for example the comments of 
Finkelstein J in Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty 
Ltd and Others (2000) 177 ALR 231, 265. 
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which they act. Many, but not all cases involve torts relating to intellectual 
property infringements and precedents are drawn from several 
Commonwealth jurisdictions.  
 
The approach taken by Finkelstein J in Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v 
Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others (‘Root Quality’)67 has been 
noted as a fourth test in this area.68 However, it is submitted that while the 
foundation of this approach is a different, the end result of Finkelstein J’s 
analysis is based on the earlier tests.69  
 
In any event, the fact that so many tests have evolved demonstrates the 
unsettled nature of this area of law. Anderson argues that this is because of the 
unresolved tensions between tort law and company law, combined with a lack 
of theoretical consistency and understanding by the courts.70 Similarly, Farrar 
is of the view that the courts have ‘fumbled’ with the vague and questionable 
tests, and doubts their efficacy.71 Each of the tests has been applied in 
Australia, and each has been criticized by Australian courts. Unfortunately, 
even at this point in time, the authorities differ on which test should be 
applied. 
 
1 The ‘direct or procure’ test 
 
The first test to evolve, and the test widely understood to be the easiest test to 
establish a director’s person liability, was the ‘direct or procure’ test. The test 
is attributed to Atkin J in Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical 
Syndicate Ltd (‘Performing Right Society’)72 and has been employed by cases 
in the United Kingdom73 and Australia,74 in many instances involving 
intellectual property infringement. 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
68 See generally Anderson, above n 22, 39 - 40.  
69 The “make the tort his own test”. See Part V.C.2 below. 
70 Anderson above n 22, 2-3. 
71 Farrar above n 45, 111. 
72 [1924] 1 KB 1, expanding on Lord Buckmaster’s dictum in Rainham Chemical 
Works Ltd v Belvedere Fish Guano Ltd [1921] 2 AC 465. 
73 For example, Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 
1 KB 1; C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand [1985] 2 All ER 415.  
74 Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 213; 
Australasian Performing Right Association v Jain (1990) 26 FCR 53; Martin 
Engineering Co v Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd (1991) 20 IPR 241; Microsoft Corporation 
v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd (1996) 71 FCR 231; Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Clarendon 
Homes (Aust) Pty Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 443; Autocaps (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pro-Kit Pty Ltd; 
(1999) 46 IPR 339; the test also had the support of Lee J (dissenting) in Milpurrurru 
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The court investigates whether a director expressly procured or directed the 
commission of the tort by the corporation. Whilst leaving open the degree of 
direction and procurement necessary before a director will be liable, the courts 
applying this test have expressly rejected the suggestion that a director must 
know or be reckless as to the possibility that the acts were wrongful.75 The 
cases suggest that if the directors were responsible for managing the company 
and directing the course the company followed at all material times, then they 
are equally liable with the company for the damage which flowed from the 
wrong. 
 
This test has a substantial following in Australian intellectual property cases.76 
Nevertheless, it has been criticised as irrational for imposing liability merely 
because the director expressly or impliedly directs the commission of the 
tortious act or conduct without something more, as in situations involving a 
one person company liability would be imposed in almost every case.77 In this 
regard, it is thought that this test does not give due consideration to the 
concept of the separate legal existence of the company or the fact that the 
corporation must act through its directors.78 
 
Such criticism led to the evolution of the second test which requires a further 
step before directors will be held liable for the company’s tortious acts. 
 
2 The ‘make the tort his own’ test 
 
This test is narrower than the ‘direct or procure’ test, making it more difficult 
for a director to be found personally liable. However, while courts have 
sought to justify the greater stringency in terms of policy, the test has been 
widely criticised as inadequate, uncertain in its meaning and scope, and 
circular in its reasoning.79 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
and others v Indofurn and others (1994) 130 ALR 659 [agreeing with Von Doussa J 
at first instance]. 
75 Performing Right Society Ltd v Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd [1924] 1 KB 1; C 
Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand [1985] 2 All ER 415; Kalamazoo (Aust) Pty Ltd v 
Compact Business Systems Pty Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 213. 
76 refer to n 75. 
77 White Horse Distilleries Ltd v Gregson Associates Ltd [1984] RPC 61 (Nourse J). 
78 King v Milpurrurru (1996) 136 ALR 327, 350 *(Beazley J). 
79 See for example Debenham above n 56, 527-8 and Farrar above n 45, 108; see also 
Microsoft v Auschina Polaris (1996) 142 ALR 111, 124 (Lindgren J); Universal 
Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1, [434] 
(Wilcox J). 
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The test originated in Canada with the decision in Mentmore Manufacturing 
Co Ltd v National Merchandising Manufacturing Co Inc (‘Mentmore’),80 a 
patent infringement case where the plaintiff sought to hold an individual who 
was the president and principal shareholder of the company personally liable 
for the infringement together with the company. On appeal to the Federal 
Court of Appeal Le Dain J looked closely at the issue and asked: 
 
What…is the kind of participation in the acts of the company that should 
give rise to personal liability? It is an elusive question. It would appear to be 
that degree and kind of personal involvement by which the director or officer 
makes the tortious act his own. It is obviously a question of fact to be 
decided on the circumstances of each case.81 
 
The court dismissed the action against the individual president on the grounds 
that the evidence did not establish that he ‘deliberately or recklessly embarked 
on a scheme, using the company as a vehicle, to secure profit or custom which 
rightfully belonged to the plaintiffs’.82 Although Le Dain J said that ‘[r]oom 
must be left for a broad appreciation of circumstances of each case to 
determine whether as a matter of policy they call for personal liability’,83 what 
appears to be required to render a director personally liable for torts with no 
mens rea requirement such as intellectual property infringement, is deliberate 
conduct outside the ordinary management of the company’s affairs which is 
likely to constitute infringement, or an indifference to the risk of 
infringement. In Mentmore, the fact that the directors in question imparted 
practical, business, financial and administrative policies and directives which 
led to the assembly and sale of the infringing goods was not enough to impose 
personal liability. This can be contrasted with the ‘direct or procure’ test, 
which merely requires personal involvement in the operation of the company.  
 
The Mentmore decision has been followed widely in intellectual property 
cases in Canada,84 including, interestingly, the epic Monsanto v Schmeiser85  
 
                                                 
80 (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 195.  
81 Ibid 203 (Le Dain J). 
82 Ibid 204. 
83 Ibid 205. 
84 Visa International Service Association v Visa Motel Corp [1984] 1 CPR (3d) 109; 
Hirsh Co v Spacemaker Ltd [1987] 17 CPR (3d) 89; TNT Canada Inc v Kwik Transfer 
Inc [1987] 18 CPR (3d) 51; Windsurfing International Inc v Novaction Sports Inc 
[1987] 18 CPR (3d) 230; Hirsh Co v Minshall [1988] 89 NR 136; 22 CPR (3d) 268; 
and Katun Corp v Technofax Inc [1988] 22 CPR (3d) 269; Prism Hospital Software 
Inc v Hospital Medical Research Institute [1988] 18 CPR(3d) 398,401. 
85 Monsanto Canada Inc et al v Schmeiser et al 2001 FCT 256. 
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litigation. The test has also had a judicial following in the United Kingdom,86 
and Australia.87 
 
The ‘make the tort his own’ test has been the subject of criticism by courts 
preferring the ‘direct or procure test’ on the basis that it is questionable 
whether ‘flexible considerations of policy would be capable of overriding the 
basic principles of liability according to the facts of the particular case’.88 
 
Nevertheless, like the ‘direct or procure’ test, this test has also found favour in 
Australia. In King v Milpurrurru,89 a breach of copyright case involving 
sections 36 and 37 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), the Full Court of the Federal 
Court preferred the view that a director will only be liable for the company’s 
breach of those sections where he commits, or directs the commission of the 
tort, deliberately or recklessly, so as to make the tortious conduct his own. 
Interestingly, the majority held that even where the directors’ conduct is such 
as to constitute a breach of duty90 to the company, such conduct is insufficient 
to render directors liable to third parties. 
 
In that case, the company was found at first instance91 to have breached s 37 
of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) when it imported for sale carpets which 
reproduced the respondents’ paintings. The managing director and the two 
appellants, who were both directors, but had played no part in the 
management of the company, were also found liable for copyright 
infringement. It was found by the trial judge that the degree of indifference 
exhibited by the appellants to the allegations of copyright infringement 
constituted authorisation or permission by them to the company’s continued 
importation of the carpets. A majority of the Federal Court of Appeal held that 
the appeal should be allowed as the appellants’ failure to make adequate 
enquiries and breach of duty to the company did not support the conclusion 
that they should be personally liable to a third party.  
 
                                                 
86 White Horse Distilleries Ltd v Gregson Associates Ltd [1984] RPC 61.  
87 King v Milpurrurru (1996) 136 ALR 327; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242 (5 September 2005); Root Quality 
Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others (2000) 177 
ALR 231. 
88 C Evans & Sons Ltd v Spritebrand Ltd and another [1985] 2 All ER 415 at 423. 
89 King and Another v Milpurrurru and Others (1996) 136 ALR 327 (Jenkinson and 
Beazley JJ, Lee J dissenting). 
90 The duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the company from committing serious 
breaches of the type alleged. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180 and 181 are 
relevant. 
91 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 130 ALR 659 (Von Doussa J). 
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In the course of her judgment, Beazley J reviewed the English, Canadian and 
New Zealand decisions and concluded that the principles stated in Performing 
Right Society92  did not pay sufficient heed either to the separate legal 
existence of the corporation or to the fact that the corporation acts through its 
directors. Her Honour agreed with the criticism of those decisions by Nourse J 
in White Horse Distilleries Ltd v Gregson Associates Ltd93, finding the 
Mentmore line of authority a more satisfactory approach. 
 
By way of contrast, in Microsoft Corporation v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd,94 
Lindgren J expressly disagreed with the approach of Beazley J, adopting the 
‘direct or procure’ test to find a director personally liable and stating: 
 
I find the ‘directed or procured’ test more satisfactory than the ‘making the 
tortious act his own’ test. In any event, the former test is supported by 
Australian authority which I should follow unless convinced that it is clearly 
wrong. I am not convinced that it is clearly wrong.95 
 
In that case, the company was liable for the importation and sale of unlicensed 
computer software and the director was the only individual who played any 
role in relation to the acquisition, importation and onsale of the infringing 
copies of the computer programs. Lindgren J was of the view that although 
the evidence did not go so far as to establish ‘the deliberate, willful and 
knowing pursuit of a course of conduct that was likely to constitute 
infringement or reflected an indifference to the risk of it’96 according to the  
Mentmore principles, the fact that the director in question was alone totally 
responsible for all the elements of the infringements provided for in ss 37 and 
38 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) which rendered the company liable, was 
sufficient to render him liable for those infringements also.97 
 
Judicial disagreement aside, any court which prefers the ‘make the tort his 
own’ test will find that personal liability for a company’s torts can only be 
attributed to directors in circumstances where their deliberate or reckless 
conduct otherwise distinguishes them from their role as the directing mind 
and will of the company. 
 
                                                 
92 [1924] 1 KB 1. 
93 [1984] RPC 61. 
94 Microsoft Corporation and Another v Auschina Polaris Pty Ltd and Others (1996) 
142 ALR 111. 
95  Ibid 125. 
96 Mentmore, 204-5 (Le Dain J). 
97 Ibid. 
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3 The rule in Said v Butt – The Root Quality approach 
 
In the relatively recent decision of Root Quality98 Finkelstein J referred to the 
body of authority set out in the tests above as founded on the principles 
established by Lumley v Gye.99 This is the case upon which the modern 
formulation of the tort of procuring the violation of the legal rights of another 
is based.100 
 
Finkelstein J found fault with all the traditional tests, and in particular with the 
decisions based on the ‘direct and procure’ test, noting that they do not 
properly confront the nature of corporate personality and liability of a 
corporation for the acts of its agents. One of the foundations for Finkelstein 
J’s judgment was the rule in Said v Butt,101 which originally applied to the tort 
of procuring a breach of contract and is based on recognition of the fact that 
the deliberate actions of the director in extricating his company from a 
contract may be in the company's best interests. In these circumstances courts 
consider personal liability undesirable as there is no bad faith in procuring the 
company to breach its contract, because it is preferable for the company to 
pay damages for breach of contract rather than to honour the contract.102 
Finkelstein J relied on authority that the tort is not confined to interference 
with contracts but extends to all wrongful acts done intentionally which 
damage a particular individual.103 The rule’s application therefore, was found 
to extend to the alleged patent infringement in Root Quality.  
 
The effect of this extended application of the rule in Said v Butt, which 
Finkelstein J expressly found represents the law in Australia, is that a director 
or officer acting in that capacity could not be found liable for procuring his 
corporation to infringe the rights of another.104 However, the court also relied 
on authority which confirmed that it does not necessarily follow that a director 
of a company would escape personal liability under cover of the company’s 
responsibility if he became ‘an actor’ in invading the plaintiff’s rights.105 
                                                 
98  (2000) 177 ALR 231.  
99 [1853] 118 ER 749. 
100 Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others 
(2000) 177 ALR 231, 258. 
101 [1920] 3 KB 497 (McCardie J); referred to by McTiernan J in O’Brien v Dawson 
(1942) 66 CLR 18, 34; followed in Tsaprazis v Goldcrest Properties Pty Ltd (2000) 
18 ACLC 285; Imperial Oil Ltd v C & G Holdings Ltd [1990] 62 DLR (4th) 261. 
102 Anderson above n 22, 41. 
103 Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others 
(2000) 177 ALR 231, 258. 
104 Ibid 262. 
105 Ibid, based on the reasoning of Starke J in O’Brien v Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18. 
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This assumption that personal liability in tort is possible for procuring an 
interference with legal rights led Finkelstein J to examine the issue of whether 
such personal liability undermines the principles of separate corporate 
personality and he analysed the tests referred to above on that basis. His 
Honour rejected the Performing Right Society ‘direct or procure’ test, but also 
appeared uncomfortable with the Mentmore line of authority106 as it would not 
always be easy to identify the circumstances under which a director could 
‘make the tort his own’. Ultimately he concluded: 
 
All that can be said confidently is that if a director decides that his company 
should carry out an act that results in an infringement of the rights of a third 
party, the director does not, without more, render himself personally 
liable…The director's conduct must be such that it can be said of him that he 
was so personally involved in the commission of the unlawful act that it is 
just that he should be rendered liable. If a director deliberately takes steps to 
procure the commission of an act which the director knows is unlawful and 
procures that act for the purpose of causing injury to a third party, then 
plainly it is just that liability should be imposed upon him. Lesser conduct 
may suffice. For example, if the director is recklessly indifferent as regards 
whether his company's act was unlawful and would cause harm, that may 
also suffice. In the end it will depend upon the facts of each particular case. 
Where the boundary lies, between the non-tortious conduct of a director who 
acts bona fide within the course of his authority and the tortious conduct of a 
director who acts deliberately and maliciously to cause harm, cannot be 
stated with any precision.107 
 
This passage has recently been cited with approval by Wilcox J in 
Sharman,108 who agreed to adopt the approach because he believed it 
encapsulates the essence of the approach taken (even if not the language used) 
in many intellectual property cases decided by the Federal Court.109 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
106 This was also noted by Wilcox J in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman 
License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1.   
107 Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others 
(2000) 177 ALR 231, 268. 
108 (2005) 220 ALR 1. 
109 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1, 103 [434] referring to APRA v Jain (1990) 96 ALR 619; Microsoft v Auschina 
Polaris (1996) 142 ALR 111 and Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 
65 IPR 409, [130].  
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4 Analysis of current position on general law tests  
 
Commentators agree that the reason for the establishment of so many tests is 
the courts’ inadequate understanding of the theoretical issues underpinning 
this area.110 However, from a practical viewpoint, the question is whether an 
examination of the cases in Australia relating to intellectual property 
infringements points to a common application of principles by the courts for 
the imposition of director liability. 
 
The predominance of authority in Australian intellectual property cases rests 
with both the ‘direct and procure’ test from Performing Right Society, and the 
‘make the tort his own’ test derived from the Mentmore line of authority.111 
Interestingly, some courts have found the distinction between the tests to be 
largely irrelevant. For example, in Allen Manufacturing Company Pty Ltd v 
McCallum & Co Pty Ltd112 the Full Federal Court noted that:  
 
The difference between the two tests may be more apparent than real. We are 
not aware of any case in which it has been held that a director or officer of a 
company directed or procured the company’s infringing act, yet that person 
escaped liability because he or she did not deliberately, wilfully or 
knowingly pursue a course of conduct that was likely to constitute 
infringement or that reflected indifference to the risk of infringement. This 
may be because, in practice, an act of direction or procurement will generally 
meet the Mentmore test. 113 
 
The court found that evidence did not show the relevant individual was 
merely acting as director of the company found liable for design infringement. 
Rather, he had personal knowledge of the registered design, applied for 
registration of the infringing design and granted a licence and accepted a sub-
licence to use the design. 
 
Similarly in APRA v Metro On George Pty Ltd,114 Bennett J found in a 
copyright infringement case that one director (but not another) was liable 
‘under both the tests in Mentmore and in Performing Rights, to the extent that 
there is a difference between them’.115 The director found liable was found to  
 
                                                 
110  See generally Anderson above n 22; Fridman above n 26; Farrar above n 45. 
111 For this reason the further test of assumption of liability has not been discussed 
here.  
112 [2001] FCA 1838 (20 December 2001). 
113 Ibid [43] - [44]. 
114 (2004) 61 IPR 575. 
115 Ibid 594. 
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have ordered, directed or procured the company to carry on its infringing 
activities while pursuing a ‘knowing, deliberate, willful’116course of conduct, 
indifferent to the risk of infringement. 
 
It is possible that the courts are more recently preferring the Mentmore line of 
authority, or declining to decide on a test because the facts before them are 
sufficient to satisfy both tests. It does not appear currently to be the case that 
courts generally prefer the test with a higher standard to avoid imposing 
liability if that is the result they wish to achieve. 117 
 
Some common features have emerged from the cases. It seems that in cases 
where the director is the will or “the moving spririt” of a company, courts are 
more likely to find a director liable. In Martin Engineering Co v Nicaro 
Holdings Pty Ltd,118 Burchett J expressly found that the individual was ‘a 
director and the moving spirit’ of the companies and there was no doubt, on 
the evidence, that he was personally involved in the activities and authorised, 
directed and promoted the infringements. In Sharman, for example, the court 
found it was a combination of a director being intimately involved in the 
activities of the company, formulation or approval of its policies and generally 
being ‘the boss’.119 
 
The most recent decisions of the Federal Court have demonstrated a 
preference for the Mentmore test, despite a general criticism that its meaning 
and scope are uncertain.120 Perhaps it is the principles of Mentmore rather than 
the wording of the test that attracts judicial agreement. As Wilcox J stated in 
Sharman, ‘I prefer to eschew any catchphrase and consider the justice of the 
case’.121 
 
Commentators122 have stated that an authoritative decision is needed on a test 
which is developed on the basis of an evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each present test while satisfying the policy issues relating to  
 
                                                 
116 Mentmore, 203 (Le Dain J).  
117 Cf Farrar above n 45, 111. 
118 (1991) 20 IPR 241. 
119  Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1, 104 [439]. 
120  For example, ibid, 103 [434]; Microsoft v Auschina Polaris (1996) 142 ALR 111, 
124. 
121 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1,103  [434]. 
122  Such as Farrar above n 45, 111. 
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the clash of fundamental principles. I would suggest that the Australian courts 
are at least moving closer to that goal and towards a test which requires a 
higher level of involvement in the infringing activity than simply the direction 
or procurement. The view of Finkelstein J in Root Quality may ultimately be 
the middle ground sought by courts and commentators in relation to this issue 
with its emphasis on what is just in the circumstances of the case: 
 
If a director deliberately takes steps to procure the commission of an act 
which the director knows is unlawful and procures that act for the purpose of 
causing injury to a third party, then plainly it is just that liability should be 
imposed upon him. Lesser conduct may suffice.123 
 
However, whether this approach in fact surmounts the problems relating to the 
meaning and scope of the Mentmore test is questionable. 
 
5 Application to non directors 
 
The principles set out above extend to individuals other than directors of 
companies. The intellectual property cases in this area accord with the view 
that a person need not be a director of a company to be personally liable for 
wrongs committed against a third party ; hence, any test applied by the courts 
can apply equally to directors, managers, employees or other officers of a 
company. 
 
Branson J in Microsoft v Goodview Electronics Pty Ltd124 quoted Microsoft v 
Auschina Polaris125 with approval in finding an employee in control of a 
company liable for copyright breaches in accord with the policy rationale of 
holding individuals liable for a company’s tortious acts.126 
 
Most recently, Wilcox J in Sharman127 stated that he adopted the test of 
Finkelstein J in Root Quality, ‘with the qualification that the person need not 
be a director of the company’128. And as Le Dain J stated in the Mentmore 
case: ‘I do not think the question whether or not he was a director is important 
in so far as liability is concerned. It is what he actually did that matters.’129 
                                                 
123 Root Quality Pty Ltd and Another v Root Control Technologies Pty Ltd and Others 
(2000) 177 ALR 231, 268. 
124 (2000) 49 IPR 578. 
125 (1996) 142 ALR 111. 
126 Microsoft v Goodview Electronics Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 578, 587. 
127 (2005) 220 ALR 1. 
128 Ibid 103. 
129  [1978] 89 DLR (3d) 195, 197. 
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VI CONCLUSION- IP RIGHTS V CORPORATE LAW PRINCIPLE 
 
It is now beyond question that a director does not enjoy a general immunity 
from liability by virtue of his position as a director. While it is obvious that a 
measure of caution is required so as not to discourage commercial enterprise 
and adventure by subjecting a director to overly onerous potential liabilities, it 
is equally obvious that a stage has been reached in corporate law and practice 
that requires a greater level of responsibility for actions by directors. More 
onerous corporate governance rules, directors’ duties,130 liability for insolvent 
trading by companies, and the general community-fuelled push for greater 
corporate social responsibility makes this evolution inevitable. The corporate 
world has changed beyond recognition since  the time of Salomon. 
 
The rapid expansion of technology has also meant a surge in the importance 
and expanse of intellectual property law. There is an expectation by parties 
whose rights have been infringed that the law will allow them to recover 
adequate compensation and that punishments will be imposed on wrongdoers 
which are effective to deter potential infringers.  
 
Commentators on the issue may continue to argue for the primacy of 
corporate law.131 However, it seems clear that in Australia, courts are willing 
to impose liability on directors for infringements by companies of third 
parties’ intellectual property rights. The only unresolved issue is the route 
taken by the court in question to deal with the matter. On this practical point, 
the authorities continue to be in some disarray. Most recent authorities 
continue to refer to concepts of joint tortfeasance, authorisation and/or those 
other general law principles which lead to liability of directors. There is no 
consensus on the question of which test to apply when discussing these 
general principles. However, there does appear to be some movement by the 
Federal Court towards a test along the Mentmore line - a test which is more 
demanding than the ‘direct or procure’ principle, and one which follows the 
reasoning of Finkelstein J in Root Quality and Wilcox J in Sharman.  
 
A more interesting aspect of this issue is whether this willingness to impose 
personal liability on directors is the result of a conscious (or unconscious) 
acknowledgement by the courts that any strict application of the separate  
 
                                                 
130 Note that behaviour constituting breach of director’s duties in relation to the 
infringing activities was thought sufficient to impose liability by both Lee J 
(dissenting) and Von Doussa J at first instance in the Milpurrurru case. 
131 Eg, Grantham and Rickett above n 24, 139. 
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entity principle would undermine the incentive to create that underlies 
intellectual property theory and practice. There is no explicit indication by 
courts that the imposition of a stricter test for director liability is any way 
connected to the subject matter of the infringement in question. 
 
In any event, it must be questioned whether this is reason enough to displace 
any primacy of company law theory which may have existed, at least in the 
absence of any more socially justifiable policy (such as that relating to cases 
involving injury to involuntary tort creditors). The incentive to commercial 
enterprise and adventure which underpins the separate entity principle must be 
considered to be equally important in economic terms. 
 
In reality, the clash between policy and principle which underscores director 
liability in tort cases generally, and more particularly, the issue of company 
law principle and the incentive (or reward) theory which justifies intellectual 
property is more about balance than it is about competition or primacy. The 
overall impression created by the decision in Sharman132 is of the Federal 
Court’s reluctance to shift the present balance of rights between intellectual 
property owners and intellectual property users.133 On this basis, it is difficult 
to assert with any confidence that intellectual property is obtaining, or indeed, 
deserving of special treatment - that if directors are not held responsible 
(where companies can avoid their liability for whatever reason), then the 
incentive provided by intellectual property rights  will be undermined leading 
to less innovation and creation. 
 
If there is only one certainty in this area of law at the present time, it is the 
fact that directors, officers and other employees of companies guilty of 
intellectual property infringement can expect to have their own actions 
carefully scrutinized by courts who are more willing than ever before to 
impose upon them personal liability for those actions. Whether that  
 
                                                 
132 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 
ALR 1.  
133 Ibid 5. Wilcox J appeared to be sympathetic to the respondents’ position saying “I 
understand the argument in favour of more widespread licensing of copyright works. 
No doubt that course would have commercial implications for sound recording 
distributors. Whether or not they should take it is a matter to be determined by them. 
Unless and until they do decide to take that course, they are entitled to invoke such 
protective rights as the law affords them.” And at [351] “it is not realistic to believe 
legal action against individual infringers will stamp out, or even significantly reduce, 
file-sharing infringements of copyright”. 
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willingness relates to a judicial acceptance of the balance to be struck between 
intellectual property owners and users, or to a general subsidence in the 
importance of the separate entity principle due to the emergence of greater 
community expectations of company directors is unclear; it is most likely a 
combination of these factors at work. Corporations and intellectual property 
may be legal fictions, but their influence in today’s commercial world is real 
and substantial - at moments when their principles and interests collide, 
balance, rather than primacy, is the key. 
 
